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Abstract  
Providing adequate levels of farm animal welfare is a challenge in today’s societies. Economic research shows 
that neither market valuation for credence attributes in opaque markets, nor transparency improved market 
valuation with labelling schemes, nor non-market valuation in hypothetical markets to take account of non-use 
values, nor non-monetary valuation in an ethical context will suffice to provide adequate levels of farm animal 
welfare. Monetary and non-monetary valuation problems stem from the complex concept of farm animal 
welfare and ethical challenges in utilitarian and anthropocentric approaches. Animal centred valuation of farm 
animal welfare is suggested as one future venue of economic research requiring to leave behind speciesism. 
Keywords: farm animal welfare; public good; transaction costs; hypothetical bias; animal centred valuation;  
Introduction 
Provision of farm animal welfare (FAW) suffers from different forms of market and other institutional failures 
and is thus provided at suboptimal levels from a societal welfare perspective (e.g. Grethe 2017; Harvey et al. 
2013). In the absence of reliable information about FAW, as a credence attribute, in existing markets for animal 
products mechanisms of adverse selection (cf. Akerlof 1978) lead to suboptimal FAW provision. Within market-
based approaches assuming the availability of better information, labelling programs are discussed and have 
been implemented widely to solve the adverse selection problem. Still these programs’ successes remain 
limited indicated by generally low market shares. Also, traditional government interventions are hardly able to 
provide a level of FAW that seems optimal within societies as high FAW standards might cause welfare losses 
for consumers who are not interested in FAW (e.g. Bennett 1997). At the same time institutional innovations 
are developed by market actors: In Germany an alliance of retailers and farmer organizations innovated an 
institutional setting (Schulze-Geisthövel 2018). Within this system farmers are financially compensated from a 
retailer fed fund when implementing higher FAW standards. Until 2018, the system worked without product 
segregation and without labelling products at the point-of-sale – thus introducing a quasi private tax-and-
subsidy-system in the market. From these diverse perspectives, it is worthwhile to look at different institutional 
settings from an economic perspective in order to gain a better understanding of possible shortcomings of 
hitherto existing approaches and derive possible research needs. 
Asymmetric information and FAW as public good  
Labelling of FAW has been suggested as an instrument to increase FAW at farm level by improving market 
transparency and allowing better-informed purchase decisions for consumers. However, individual consumers 
buying FAW labelled products contribute to the provision of FAW as public good. Public goods’ general 
characteristics are non-rivalry and non-excludability, i.e. as FAW is provided in a society no one can be excluded 
from enjoying this increased FAW and enjoying this increased FAW does not reduce consumption possibilities 
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for others (Cowen 2006). Thus, if FAW is understood as a public good, its provision would be expected to suffer 
from free rider effects. Circumventing the free rider problem is attempted by market differentiation and 
creating club goods within private approaches. Implemented as private or public labelling, these approaches 
implicitly assume that for the public good FAW excludability can be created. However, Uehleke et al. (2018) 
show that stated demand for FAW in an individual situation is lower than in a collective situation indicating the 
difficulty to create excludability. These results challenge public and private labelling approaches for FAW and 
suggest to treat FAW as a public good. When Enneking (2019) finds low WTP for FAW in a real market 
experiment the public good character of FAW is neglected. The private vs. collective decision framework of 
Uehleke et al. (2018) could partly explain these low revealed WTP for FAW in a market experiment.  
Transaction costs and network externalities in a market context 
Low provision of FAW can also be understood as a network externality linked to supply- and demand-side 
economies of scale. Some authors also term this as the ‘infant industry’ argument (e.g. Hartmann et al. 2015). 
Within nascent and marginal FAW labelling programs transaction costs are high and economies of scale can not 
be realized yet.  
Shelf prices of FAW products indicate pagatoric costs in terms of financial means required to purchase a 
product. Yet, additional calculatory costs might be linked to the purchase process of FAW products. For 
consumers, shelf prices of FAW products neglect high transaction costs, like information, search and 
transportation costs, as long as FAW products are not readily available in standard retail formats. In most 
cases, transportation costs would be pagatoric costs, as might be the case with some information costs if 
information has to be paid for. Larger shares of transaction costs might be rather calculatory costs for time 
spend by consumers for searching and transporting FAW products available in few and possibly distant retail 
formats. Valued at time’s opportunity cost, no monetary flows of financial means are linked to these 
transaction costs while still being real, as time spend for searching and transporting might be considered utility-
reducing. Through online-shopping, search costs might be reduced and transportation costs would be 
transformed into pagatoric logistic costs.  
Additional transaction costs stem from dispersed demand for FAW products. Pooling of FAW demand by 
consumers could accelerate development of supply of FAW products. Yet this pooling of demand requires 
collective action. Establishment of collective action is also linked with transaction costs. No single potential 
consumer of FAW products has incentives strong enough for pooling demand with other potential consumers. 
However, once this pooling would have been organized, all FAW-interested consumers would benefit. This 
illustrates a typical prisoner dilemma due to network externalities in demand. As soon as market shares of FAW 
increase and products become readily available in standard retail format, transaction costs for consumers will 
decrease. Thus, high transactions costs linked to dispersed demand and small supply quantities indicate 
economies of scale in demand and network externalities in pooling of demand.  
On the supply side, actual demand linked to higher prices for farmers and supply-chain-actors would incentivise 
the provision of more FAW. Due to underdeveloped markets and a lack of observable market prices, 
stakeholders are dependent on WTP estimates. Single private actors with no market power often lack 
incentives to invest in market developments, as WTP studies are said to suffer from hypothetical bias (see 
discussion below) and as calculatory consumer prices in nascent programs are prohibitive for growth (see 
discussion above). In addition, investments in the reputation and trustworthiness of a label program are only 
feasible if large product quantities can be included in the label program. Otherwise the per unit cost of 
building-up a label becomes prohibitive. Also processing, logistics and trade of FAW labelled products require 
large quantities to be produced and sold in order to realize economies of scale.  
It can be concluded that multi-actor private initiatives are caught in lock-ins of a prisoner dilemma as no single 
market actor has incentives to invest in establishing label programs. If transactions cost for forming multi-
actor-initiatives decrease or if market actors with considerable market shares and market power take the 
initiative and if opportunity costs of neglecting labelling programs increase, market actors – especially those 
with market power or a number of smaller actors supported by government initiatives – will have more 
incentives to ally themselves for the establishment of labelling programs (cf. Grethe 2017). 
Informational dilemmata 
Standard economic reasoning suggests government interventions including minimum standards, bans, 
subsidies and taxes (cf. Grethe 2017; Ingenbleek et al. 2012). Recent behavioural economic research and 
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political economy considerations challenge such classical approaches (Carlsson et al. 2007; Harvey et al. 2013). 
This also applies to publicly funded and promoted classical information and education approaches that might 
not lead to better-informed consumer decisions due to information overload and possible information 
misconceptions of the complex FAW concept (cf. Buerke 2016; Fitzpatrick et al. 2016; Hoogland et al. 2007; 
Hotaling et al. 2015; Köcher et al. 2016). More information does not necessarily mean better information and 
more labels on food products might decrease willingness-to-pay (WTP) (e.g. Monier-Dilhan 2018). New 
governance structures for wider stakeholder participation, like deliberative polls or citizen assemblies, are 
discussed to allow better-informed decision-making (cf. Grethe 2017; Rovers et al. 2017; Schulze-Walgern et al. 
2018).   
Monetary valuation of FAW at societal level 
The provision of FAW is necessarily coupled with producing physical animal products indicating a 
conceptualization as positive external effect in production (Carlsson et al. 2007). On the consumption side, 
consumers’ perceptions that certain aspects of livestock production give rise to low FAW are a potential source 
of disutility. This disutility may be associated with consumers’ individual consumption of livestock products and 
with other persons’ consumption. The latter is a negative externality of consumption in society (Harvey et al. 
2013), resulting in indirect costs associated with livestock production. In a societal transformation curve, the 
optimal level of providing animal products and FAW would be determined by the negative inverse relationship 
of the respective prices. While market prices of animal products are readily available, there is no market 
providing monetary price information on FAW. Price estimates for FAW would be required to determine a 
society’s optimal production point. Yet, economic analyses of FAW suffer from a dearth of price information on 
FAW. Yet, several approaches have been employed or could be employed to derive prices for FAW 
independent of physical production (Yang et al. 2019).  
WTP studies have been a common approach to give FAW a ‘price’.  A high number of WTP studies for FAW are 
available based on stated preferences. Yet most of them are said to suffer from different forms of hypothetical 
biases defined as the difference between stated and revealed WTP (Hensher 2010; Lagerkvist et al. 2010; Clark 
et al. 2017). In some other contexts, differences between stated and revealed preferences are also termed as 
citizen-consumer duality or consumer-citizen-gap (e.g. Grethe 2017; Hartmann et al. 2015). These terms 
emphasize the difference between a private good character of animal products with certain FAW attributes for 
which consumers would show WTP in a market context and a public good character of FAW for which citizens 
would show WTP in a non-market context through supporting minimum standards and accepting the resulting 
higher market prices or through supporting a tax-and-subsidy system. From a more psychological perspective, 
the difference between stated and revealed WTP is referred to as attitude-behaviour-gap (e.g. Harvey et al. 
2013; Hartmann et al. 2015). Several hypotheses have been brought forward to explain hypothetical bias in 
general and more specifically to FAW (cf. Hartmann et al. 2015): 
Hypothetical bias in revealed vs. stated WTP studies might be linked to low vs. high involvement purchase 
decision situations linked to the basic concept of dual process model of thought.  According to this model, one 
process is fast, intuitive and reliant on short cuts and heuristics (system 1), and one is controlled, analytic, slow, 
deliberate, and easily fatigued (system 2) (cf. Kahneman 2002 & 2011). In this context, WTP studies working 
with survey methods activate system 2 of analytic, deliberate and slow thinking where complex dimensions of 
FAW might rather lead to high WTP estimates compared to low involvement situations in daily shopping. In low 
involvement situations, participants in observational studies might rather remain in system 1 of fast thinking 
neglecting the complexities of FAW. Thus, remaining in system 1 might lead to purchase decisions revealing low 
WTP for FAW. In this context, Hartmann et al. (2015) refer to the ‘meat antagonism’ as one reason for 
hypothetical bias in WTP studies for FAW. While consumers feel empathetic about farm animals they are faced 
with the dilemma that animals have to be raised in confined systems and slaughtered for being able to enjoy 
meat, milk, eggs or any other animal product. Stated WTP for FAW could then be interpreted as the WTP for 
solving this dilemma in a high involvement survey situation where system 2 is active. Low involvement, routine 
purchase situations with low revealed WTP for FAW would indicated the psychological capability of humans 
within system 1 to suppress the meat antagonism dilemma. In such situations consumers use heuristics to 
delegate responsibility of solving the meat antagonism to supply chain actors to allow them quick and easy 
purchase decisions leading to low levels of revealed WTP for FAW. 
In addition, strategic response behaviour to incentivise a broader and more diverse future supply of FAW 
products and to create future consumption options might lead to over-stating WTP (Bergeron et al. 2019; Lusk 
et al. 2007). This might be linked to high transaction costs in the formation of collective action as described 
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above. Strategic response behaviour in overstating WTP for FAW might be considered as a short-cut of leaving 
the prisoner dilemma faced in dispersed demand for FAW. 
Due to a dominance of WTP studies based on stated preferences, more observational studies based on 
revealed preferences for FAW would be required (e.g. Enneking 2019; Olesen et al. 2010). Hedonic price 
analyses would be a possible solution. This approach assumes that the price of a good can be decomposed into 
prices of the attributes that make up that good (Lancaster 1966) therefore being able to de-couple physical 
product attributes and FAW. Few WTP studies based on this approach are available (e.g. Chang et al. 2010; 
Karipidis et al. 2005). Already Bennett (1995) concisely discusses the limitations associated with hedonic price 
analyses in the context of FAW:  
“First, there is only a very limited number of livestock products on the market which have clear animal 
welfare friendly attributes in the eyes of consumers. Second, estimates of consumers’ valuations of 
these attributes from purchasing behaviour still fail to capture public good and non-user aspects. 
Third, any analysis of existing animal welfare friendly production practices is necessarily ex-post and 
may be of little help with ex-ante analysis of possible legislation or codes of practice, except by 
analogy. Arguably, ex-ante analysis is of more use to policy makers.” 
Non-monetary price trade-offs that could be transformed into monetary values would be an additional 
alternative to estimate WTP for FAW, e.g. time invested for caring for animals to improve FAW or time for 
lobbying FAW valued by the opportunity costs of time of the referred persons. The literature is characterized 
by a paucity of studies taking such approaches with respect to FAW but provides examples in other fields 
(Adamowicz et al. 1991; Matumoto 2014). 
FAW credits – analogous to CO2-credits – have been proposed as a market based approach in economics in an 
attempt to decouple markets for animal products and FAW and deriving values for FAW (Lusk & Norwood 
2011). Within such an innovative scheme, farmers (or any other animal care-giver) would be given property 
rights on the provision of FAW independent of physical production of animal products. Such FAW credits could 
be traded independently from physical product flows. They could be bought by FAW concerned consumers 
directly irrespective of their dietary preferences for animal products or by any consumer representatives such 
as retailers in order to create larger demand and thus supply for FAW. The above described German ‘Initiative 
for animal welfare’ (Initiative Tierwohl) has had some of these components in its non-segregation design until 
2018. In addition, donations to animal protection organizations working to improve FAW could be interpreted 
as a first proxy of such FAW credits (De Backer 2015; Haynes et al. 2004). So far, there is a lack of empirical 
research putting these monetary flows into relation with specific efforts to improve FAW, which would allow 
deriving monetary values for more specific FAW measures. 
FAW as a complex good 
A comprehensive concept of FAW might be ambiguous and too complex for utility based WTP studies (cf. 
Serpell 2004; Mathews et al. 2007) whereby use and non-use values are typically considered. This might be 
similar to what has been discussed within ecological economics in the valuation of biodiversity (e.g. Bartkowski 
et al. 2015). Additionally, it is argued that aesthetic considerations lead to difficulties in monetary valuation 
(e.g. Martín-López et al. 2007 & 2008). Furthermore, a high complexity in defining what is meant by 
biodiversity might have similarities to defining FAW (e.g. Farnsworth et al. 2015). Some authors argue for 
valuing biodiversity like other abstract goods for instance ‘justice’ (Meinard et al. 2011), which give further 
indication of the challenges linked to the monetary valuation of FAW.  
Similar to biodiversity, FAW is embedded in philosophical, religious and ethical contexts posing particular 
challenges to the monetary valuation of FAW (Potthast 2014; Spash 2009). Valuation studies in environmental 
economics indicate ‘commodification’ as violating people’s moral standards leading to a crowding-out effect 
(Neuteleers et al. 2014). In general, crowding-out refers to the process of external incentives diminishing 
intrinsic motivation. Valuation studies of FAW might suffer from similar caveats (Bennett et al. 2002) leading to 
possible biased WTP estimates through protest answers to WTP-questions in a survey. Protest answers can 
lead to outliers in monetary WTP studies, which remain hidden in the calculation of mean values and lead to 
biased WTP for FAW (cf. Frey et al. 2018). Thus, moral goods would in principle elude monetary valuation 
because they are not accessible to exchange considerations within trade relations in a market nor in a non-
market setting ('money for goods/products/services’). There is growing evidence of a strong foundation of FAW 
in complex animal ethic systems (Luy 2018) indicating a need for comprehensive and non-financial, social 
psychological and ethical valuation approaches (cf. Spash et al. 2009).   
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WTP studies on FAW based on stated preferences might further suffer from social desirability particularly when 
surveys are implemented in face-to-face interviews (Yang et al. 2019). An additional bias to be distinguished 
from social desirability in answering survey questions is termed as “purchase of moral satisfaction” (Bennett et 
al. 2002). Higher stated than real WTP for FAW stems from a “warm glow” that respondents get for 
demonstrating WTP to help a good cause, in this case for FAW. Demonstrating WTP for FAW might then also be 
linked to a positive self-image of respondents being higher within experiments than outside, i.e. stated WTP is 
higher than revealed WTP (Johansson-Stenman et al. 2012). These biases highlight the complex relationship 
between moral behaviour and the limits of monetary valuation.  
Additionally, also benefits and efforts for farmers providing FAW go beyond financial cost-benefit-analyses 
(Wildraut et al. 2018). Non-use values represent any other economic value farmers derive from FAW. These 
types of values may explain why farmers take actions to provide FAW beyond the requirements imposed by 
legislation, productivity and profitability considerations (e.g. Schreiner et al. 2017). Legal or financial 
incentivization thereby risks a crowding-out effect undermining farmers’ intrinsic motivation for provision of 
FAW. Lagerkvist et al. (2011) further developed the notion of non-use values in FAW by defining it as consisting 
of five theoretically distinct types: Pure non-use values, existence values, bequest values, option values and 
paternalistic altruism (cf. Hansson et al. 2018). Specifically, warm glow effects or impure altruism based on 
emotion-driven farmer-animal-relations further emphasize these non-monetary benefits and costs. Impure 
altruism refers to the possibility of animals to ‘pay-back’ to farmers higher FAW standards not only in terms of 
higher productivity but also in closer human-animal-relationships, i.e. farm animals would reward farmers 
emotionally for higher FAW measures. This would lead farmers to provide more FAW than what is rewarded 
monetarily in a market or other institutional setting. 
FAW between anthropocentrism speciesism 
So far, our discussion has taken an anthropocentric perspective neglecting animals’ own perspectives and 
preferences (Johansson-Stenman 2006). FAW is an instrument to provide welfare to humans thus being a 
strictly utility oriented. In this utilitarianism view (cf. Cowen 2006) only information about human utility 
measured within real or hypothetical monetary or non-monetary markets or institutions is employed. FAW is 
accounted indirectly through human WTP for FAW in the absence of WTP studies for animals themselves. One 
shortcoming of this perspective is that it assumes humans to be able to assess FAW in their own view. Several 
studies highlight the difficulty to define FAW properly (e.g. Grethe 2017).  
In naturalistic based animal behaviour studies animals are treated paternalistically with apodictic claims (e.g. 
D’Silva 2006). Implicitly they assume FAW to be a meritorious good whereby some people claim to have a 
better understanding of what seems to be the right level of FAW (Dawkins 1998). Thereby, animals are not 
allowed to be included in societies’ and markets’ trading and negotiation relations directly. Within such an 
approach, improving FAW is assumed to be detached from any resource competition. However, providing FAW 
requires resources directly or indirectly through less productive physical production and less efficient use of 
natural resources. Therefore, animals’ preferences under consideration of trade-offs and substitutional effects 
with other scarce resources should be known to include animals more directly in the market and trading 
relations about FAW. 
If humans are not able to assess animals’ own perspective on FAW, the utilitarian view of FAW might be 
misleading.  Allowing animals to participate directly in trade with scarce resources in society would allow these 
trade-offs to be balanced. However, there is a dearth of WTP studies based on monetary and even non-
monetary prices considering animals’ preferences estimated by animal behaviour. With such approaches, FAW 
claims could be objectivized and transformed into resource requirements (Dawkins 1990). Different attempts 
have been made, for instance whereby “demand curves” for hogs have been estimated by putting food or 
social contact in exchange for physical efforts (Matthews et al. 1994; Pedersen et al. 2002). Physical efforts 
could then be transformed into monetary values by linking them also with access to feed. A similar study 
looked at demand of calves for social contact (Holm et al. 2002) and the demand of hens for litter vs. food was 
tested (Dawkins 1993). Only few specific aspects of FAW measures have been investigated for few farm 
animals with these approaches yet. Additionally, few attempts have been made yet to monetarize demand 
curves of farm animals for specific FAW measures. Lusk et al. (2011) already concluded:  
“Although we are aware of economists conducting experiments with animals to test economic 
theories of consumer choice and of animal scientists conducting experiments with animals to 
determine relative preferences for different components of a production system, we are unaware of 
joint efforts to determine the economic value animals place on production systems similar to the kind 
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of human consumer preference work done for cost-benefit analysis. This is an area that is ripe for 
future research, especially for those interested in non-speciest cost-benefit analysis.” 
It is not clear yet why these earlier suggestions have not been taken up in agricultural economics research.  
Future research directions 
Based on the above considerations, we highlight some research directions: 
- In WTP-studies on FAW, not only mean values should be aimed for, but rather a better understanding 
is required why respondents give extreme values or reject the exercise altogether. This would give 
better empirical evidence of people’s rejection of monetary reasoning about FAW and supporting the 
notion of ethical questions involved. Determinants of ethical considerations should be analysed in 
more detail. 
- Dual models of information processing taking advantage of Kahneman’s system 1 and system 2 
concept might be a venue to better understand differences between stated and revealed WTP 
estimates for FAW. More empirical research would be required to test these linkages. This also calls 
for more observational studies and real-world experiments. 
- Valuing FAW poses complex problems within traditional WTP studies similar to what has been 
observed in the valuation of biodiversity. New approaches and concepts in a rich literature on the 
valuation of biodiversity, like concepts of valuing complex goods, could be transferred to the valuation 
of FAW. Also possible crowding-out effects due to moral concerns about commodification of FAW 
have to be considered. 
- Due to high complexities in valuing FAW within government interventions, new participation 
mechanisms in forming of the political will are required but have not been analysed in the area of 
FAW. Deliberative polls, citizen assemblies and similar approaches should be tested and evaluated 
from a scientific perspective, if they are able to provide better informed political decision-making on 
FAW. 
- WTP-studies from animals’ own perspective on FAW are required. For this purpose, economists should 
collaborate with animal ethologists to integrate these two perspectives into the development of a 
FAW framework that considers animals’ own views. In this framework, animals would have to make 
choices to receive more FAW by renouncing other benefits (e.g. how much feed is an animal willing to 
renounce to gain more space). By attaching monetary values to the amount of benefits renounced it 
would be possible to link these values to human monetary trading systems. This would help to reduce 
anthropocentric and paternalistic approaches to the provision of FAW. 
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